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Is	it	all	quiet	on	the	inflation	front,	still?
What	effect	will	lockdowns	have	on	inflation?	Cyrille	Lenoël	(NIESR)	and	Corrado	Macchiarelli	(NIESR/LSE)	look
at	the	indicators	so	far	–	but	warn	that	we	should	be	cautious	about	relying	too	much	on	expectations,	particularly	in
a	period	of	great	uncertainty.
The	COVID-19	pandemic	has	the	potential	to	have	a	significant	impact	on	medium-run	inflation	expectations,
particularly	if	considered	in	conjunction	with	large	fiscal	stimuli,	ultra-loose	monetary	policies	and	the	risk	of	de-
globalisation.	The	recent	review	of	monetary	policy	framework	by	the	Federal	Reserve,	which	focuses	on	an
average	inflation	target	strategy,	highlights	how	difficult	it	can	be	to	keep	inflation	expectations	well-anchored	when
secular	factors	are	at	play	(i.e.	the	well-known	decline	in	the	neutral	real	rate	of	interest,	r*)	and	a	shock	of	the	scale
of	COVID-19	hits	the	economy.
Several	factors	could	–	in	theory	–	boost	inflation	expectations	over	the
medium	term
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Many	factors	play	into	the	formation	of	inflation	expectations.	The	large	government	stimuli,	for	instance,	may
increase	bargaining	power	for	some	parts	of	the	labour	market,	leading	to	an	increase	in	labour	costs	that	would
feed	into	higher	inflation	expectations	and	thus	wages.	Equally,	the	current	ultra-loose	monetary	policy,	including
the	continuation	of	the	large	asset	purchase	programmes	or	targeted	lending,	implies	the	presence	of	the	central
bank	as	a	large	institutional	actor	in	the	fixed-income	market.	These	bond-buying	programmes,	designed	to	push	up
inflation	from	its	current	below-target	levels,	may	–	in	theory	–	contribute	to	raising	inflation	expectations,
particularly	if	combined	with	an	expansionary	fiscal	policy.	This	might	not	happen	considering	that	the	existing
government	support	schemes	will	have	to	end	at	some	point.
A	third	factor	to	affect	inflation	expectations	is	the	risk	of	de-globalisation.	Before	COVID-19,	there	was	evidence	of
global	inflation	cycles	coinciding	with	increased	globalisation.	The	COVID-19	pandemic	has	exposed	one	of	the
downsides	of	globalisation:	a	rapid	propagation	of	the	virus	across	borders,	and	an	inability	of	countries	to	provide
basic	needs	when	they	are	closed.	Unwinding	the	globalisation	process	could	mean	the	return	of	higher	inflation	as
new	restrictions	on	cross-border	movement	of	labour	and	disruptions	in	global	supply	chains	could	push	production
costs	up	and	reduce	competition.
UK	and	US	households	provide	mixed	signals
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The	Bank	of	England/TNS	Inflation	Attitudes	survey	shows	that	inflation	expectations	have	fallen	in	the	UK	since
the	outbreak	of	the	pandemic,	but	this	effect	might	be	short-lived.	Households	expected	it	to	decline	next	year	from
2.9	percent	in	February,	down	to	1.9	percent	in	May,	and	up	to	2.2	percent	in	August.	This	may	reflect	the	fact	that
–	faced	with	increased	uncertainty	about	their	future	income	during	the	pandemic	–	people	have	reduced
consumption.	This	negative	demand	shock	drove	consumer	price	inflation	and	inflation	expectations	down	for	the
short-term.	According	to	the	latest	data	release,	headline	Consumer	Prices	Index	inflation	is	now	at	the	lowest	level
since	2015,	as	the	Eat	Out	to	Help	Out	discounts	brought	inflation	down	to	0.2%	in	August.
NIESR’s	GDP	tracker	predicts	that	the	outlook	for	the	third	quarter	of	2020	is	for	growth	of	around	15	percent	as	the
economy	reopens	–	although	this	is	on	the	assumption	of	no	second	pandemic	wave.	At	the	same	time,	real-time
wage	estimates	for	the	UK	economy	suggest	that	average	earnings	are	expected	not	to	fall	too	dramatically	in	the
short	term	as	employees	return	from	furlough	and	in	the	light	of	strong	pay	growth	in	the	public	sector,	with	average
earnings	expected	to	grow	at	an	annual	rate	of	0.2	percent.	However,	it	is	unclear	whether	this	will	lead	to	higher
short-term	inflation	expectations,	particularly	as	households’	medium-term	expectations	also	fell	(as	shown	in
Figure	1),	while	alternative	measures	of	their	expectations	from	YouGov/Citigroup	have	remained	broadly	stable.
Looking	at	financial	markets,	UK	break-even	five-year	inflation	declined	from	about	3	percent	in	the	first	two	months
of	2020,	to	2.5	percent	in	March,	before	rebounding	to	about	3	percent	in	August,	approaching	pre-COVID-19	levels
(Figure	1).
This	difference	between	consumer	surveys	and	financial	market	expectations	may	well	reflect	the	fact	that
consumers	tend	to	be	more	backward-looking	when	forming	their	expectations.
Figure	1:	UK	consumers’	and	markets’	5-year	inflation	expectations
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Source:	Bank	of	England
Figure	2:	US	consumers’	and	markets’	5-year	inflation	expectations
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Source:	US	Treasury	and	University	of	Michigan.
In	the	US,	however,	the	University	of	Michigan	Consumer	Survey	shows	that	the	pandemic	has	not	changed
households’	expectations	about	medium-term	inflation.	The	five-year	inflation	expectation	remained	around	2.5
percent,	as	it	has	been	during	the	last	four	years	(Figure	2).	The	Survey	of	Consumer	Expectations	on	inflation
analysed	by	the	NY	Federal	Reserve	confirms	that	medium-term	inflation	expectations	have	not	significantly
changed	since	the	beginning	of	the	COVID-19	crisis,	while	highlighting	that	survey	participants	were	increasingly
uncertain	about	inflation.	The	fact	that	medium-term	inflation	expectations	did	not	drop	immediately	in	the	US	may
also	have	to	do	with	the	combination	of	larger	monetary	and	fiscal	responses.	The	fiscal	stimulus	has	been
comparatively	more	substantial	in	the	US	than	in	the	UK	(9	percent	of	2019	GDP	in	the	US	versus	6	percent	in	the
UK,	according	to	the	Bruegel	institute),	although	loan	guarantees	have	been	larger	in	the	UK.
Markets	initially	expected	a	drop	in	inflation,	but	are	now	back	to	pre-
COVID-19	levels
US	Treasury	inflation-protected	swaps	(TIPS)	suggest	that	expected	inflation	has	only	briefly	declined	since	the
outbreak	of	the	pandemic.	US	five-year	expected	inflation	declined	from	between	1.5	to	1.75	percent	in	the	first	two
months	of	2020	to	0.5	percent	in	March,	before	rebounding	to	1.5	percent	in	August	(Figure	2).
LSE Covid 19 Blog: Is it all quiet on the inflation front, still? Page 4 of 5
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-09-16
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/09/16/is-it-all-quiet-on-the-inflation-front/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/
The	modest	decline	in	inflation	expectations	in	the	US	and	the	UK	according	to	bond	markets	stands	in	stark
contrast	with	what	was	seen	during	the	financial	crisis,	when	five-year	expected	inflation	became	negative	in	both
the	US	and	UK,	reaching	troughs	of	-2.2	percent	in	the	US	(November	2008)	and	-1	percent	in	the	UK	(December
2008).
A	comparison	of	inflation	expectations	over	time	suggests	that	markets	may	be	betting	that	the	COVID-19	crisis	will
be	more	short-lived	than	the	financial	crisis.	Certainly,	the	financial	sector	is	much	better	capitalised	now	than	it	was
in	2008/09.	Also,	the	supply	shock	caused	by	COVID-19	and	the	associated	lockdowns,	alongside	the	demand
shock,	may	play	a	role.	Lost	output	during	the	lockdown	(and	during	partial	reopening)	implied	a	rise	in	unit	costs
(mostly	due	to	fixed	costs	or	costs	like	rent	etc.)	and	higher	mark-ups	(mostly	due	to	a	lower	turnover	in	the	service
sector).	These	might	have	played	a	role	in	the	milder	downward	adjustment	in	inflation	expectations,	despite	the
much	larger	contraction.
Longer	maturities	along	the	implied	inflation	spot	curve	strikingly	confirm	how	both	curves	have	remained	flat	for
both	the	US	and	the	UK.	Financial	markets	are	still	predicting	lower	implied	inflation	at	lower	maturities,	but	the
difference	between	the	five-year	and	30-year	is	unimportant:	US	30-year	expected	inflation	is	6	basis	points	higher
than	the	five-year	at	1.71	percent,	and	UK	30-year	expected	inflation	is	14	basis	points	below	the	five-year	at	3.15
percent.	This	does	not	mean	markets	expect	the	Fed	or	the	Bank	of	England	not	to	achieve	their	inflation	target.
Rather,	it	implies	that	the	perceived	risks	of	deflation	based	on	the	yield	curve	are	anyway	limited	for	now.
To	conclude,	there	is	no	sign	of	a	major	change	in	inflation	for	the	moment.	Although	inflation	expectations	remain
low	for	the	short-term,	the	information	contained	in	financial	markets	shows	little	to	no	changes	for	the	medium-
term,	while	movements	in	household	surveys	remain	rather	mixed,	particularly	for	the	UK.	However,	as	the
relationship	between	expectations	and	outcomes	has	become	blurred,	especially	in	recent	years,	we	should	be
careful	when	assessing	the	role	of	expectations	in	guiding	future	policy,	particularly	during	periods	of	heightened
uncertainty	like	this	one.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.	A	previous	version	of
this	article	appeared	on	the	NIESR	blog.
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